I n the 1970s, psychologists identified an inconsistency in human decision making that had many economists concerned. A series of studies showed that under certain circumstances, people would prefer one type of lottery over another but place a higher monetary value on playing the (seemingly) less preferred lottery. Such preference reversals, as they were called, challenged fundamental assumptions in economics.
In an attempt to resolve this issue, two economists, David Grether and Charlie Plott, conducted an extremely rigorous series of experiments designed specifically to try to disprove the existence of preference reversals by identifying and testing different possible explanations for the phenomenon. In 1979, they published their results in the premier economic journal, the American Economic Review. 1 Put simply, despite their best efforts to refute preference reversals, Grether and Plott had to admit that the effect remained and that the field of economics needed to change in order to address it.
I believe that we are at a similar point in time in terms of the use of 1-in-X formats (e.g., ''you have 1 in 220 chance'') to communicate risk. There has been ongoing debate for a while about the use of this format. On one hand, 1-in-X formats have a seemingly valuable simplicity to them and are commonly used in everyday conversation. As a result, they have been used in medical risk communication for decades, especially in the fields of obstetrics (with regard to prenatal fetal risk testing) and genetic counseling. 2 On the other hand, several studies in the past 15 y have suggested that use of the 1-in-X format might have significant drawbacks when compared with alternative frequency-based formats. For example, Grimes and Snively conducted a simple, yet elegant, study using a multiethnic population that showed that women were much more likely to correctly identify the larger of a pair of risks when the information was presented in rate format (e.g., 2.6 per 1000 women) versus a 1-in-X proportion format (e.g., 1 in 384). 3 More recently, Cuite and coauthors showed that people presented with statistics using the 1-in-X format had significantly greater difficulty doing basic mathematical operations (e.g., doubling the risk) than those presented with other formats. 4 Use of 1-in-X formats is not universal, however. Many health communications use what Pighin and colleagues call N-in-X*N formats that convert the ratio to have round number denominators (e.g., 100, 1000, or 10 000). For example, public health reports often use rates (e.g., 3.5 per 10 000 people) to show epidemiological risks. Decision aids have increasingly used what they call a frequency format (e.g., 5 out of 1000 patients) to inform patients of disease, and Schwartz and colleagues developed a ''drug facts box'' 5 that uses the frequency format to present the risks and benefits of medication.
If the Grimes and Cuite articles are analogous to the original decision psychology findings about preference reversals, then Pighin and colleagues' article in this issue is the equivalent of Grether and Plott. The article reports a systematic investigation of reactions to 1-in-X risk formats, using iterative experiments and between-subjects designs that were designed to test a series of alternative explanations. 6 The authors even carefully tested whether the number of digits shown (as distinct from the level of risk) is an independent predictor of risk perceptions. Pighin and coauthors show that 1-in-X formats systematically evoke higher risk perceptions than rate/ frequency formats. In other words, use of this format not only creates confusion but also systematically biases risk perceptions in ways that elevate perceived threat. Providing icon arrays does mitigate this effect, a finding that reinforces the growing support for use of such visual displays as best practice. [7] [8] [9] Unfortunately, such graphics are not currently widely used by practitioners and may not be feasible for certain applications (e.g., telephone consultations).
According to Reyna's fuzzy trace theory, people encode risk statistics by assessing their core meaning. 10 These meanings are summarized in ''gist'' representations that then become the primary determinants of perceptions and behaviors. Although this is speculation, the reason that 1-in-X formats evoke different and stronger risk perceptions than do Nin-X*N formats may be that they evoke different gist representations.
1-in-X formats are almost exclusively used for lowprobability events, generally less than 10% risk and often less than 1%. When displaying such low risks, formats that emphasize the part-to-whole relationship, such as N-in-X*N formats (and their graphical siblings, pictographs/icon arrays) are likely to evoke a gist meaning of ''this is unlikely to happen.'' However, 1-in-X formats may evoke different gist meanings. The fact that the numerator is 1 means that there is no processing of the numerator's magnitude, only its existence. As a result, the more fundamental message of ''it could happen!'' may be the primary message that remains to be encoded. If correct, this would suggest that 1-in-X formats tend to emphasize the possibility of harm rather than its probability.
The idea that 1-in-X formats emphasize existence of risk is reflected in their use to show the approximate magnitude of extremely small risks (e.g., 1 in 1 million). These communications aim to convey what order of magnitude the risk is rather than anything more precise. Even then, however, people tend to be insensitive to even large differences in very small risks unless substantial contextual information is provided to increase the evaluability of the information. 11 The Pighin study is also important because it adds to the accumulating evidence that use of 1-in-X formats is nonnormative. As the authors note, the fact that the risk perceptions of participants who viewed icon array graphics corresponded closely with those of participants who viewed the number-only N-in-X*N format strongly suggests that number-only 1-in-X formats lead to perceptual distortions. When combined with previous evidence from direct comparisons of formats, I believe this study puts the question of the appropriateness of 1-in-X formats to rest.
Twelve years ago, Grimes and Snively concluded their article by stating that ''the traditional use of proportions to express risk in genetic counseling lacks scientific basis.'' 3(p910) Their words are no less true today. We need to move the conversation about 1-in-X formats past mere documentation of problems and address the significant need to change clinical practice. Although 1-in-X formats are simple and familiar, clinicians, counselors, and educators now have ample evidence to support use of the many alternatives available to them.
If a clinician intentionally prescribes a medication or surgical therapy known to cause harm when an alternative that has proven to be both safer and more effective is clearly identified and readily available, most people will express concern about that clinician's decision making. The clinician's actions are certainly poor care and might meet the standard for malpractice. Given the current state of evidence from Pighin and others, any continued use of 1-in-X formats to communicate medical risk to patients is similarly intolerable.
